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Abstract 
 
This paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use 
mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white 
lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest. We present a permissive result 
wherein by using just a single detail-free mechanism, any alternative can be uniquely 
implemented in iterative dominance as long as the agents regard this alternative as being 
socially desirable. 
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1. Introduction 
  
This paper investigates the implementation problem in which the central planner 
wishes to choose the socially desirable alternative, although she/he is not aware of this 
alternative. We assume that there are three agents who are correctly aware of this 
alternative. The central planner delegates the alternative choice to these agents by 
requesting them to make honest announcements. The central issue of the implementation 
theory is whether their honest announcements can be supported by the unique Nash 
equilibrium in a decentralized procedure. For previous works in the implementation 
literature, see the surveys conducted by Moore (1992), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), and 
Maskin and Sjöström (2002). 
From the viewpoint of behavioral economics, any agent to whom the central planner 
delegates the alternative choice should be expected to take her/his social preference into 
account. For instance, she/he may dislike failing to measure up to the expectations of the 
central planner because of her/his guilt aversion. This tendency is supported by the 
laboratory experiments conducted by Gneezy (2005) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). 
However, barring a few works such as Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) and Eliaz (2002), 
previous works did not consider this behavioral aspect. For details on behavioral game 
theory in general, see the survey conducted by Camerer (2006).  
In order to incentivize the agents, the central planner has to carefully design a 
mechanism. From the practical viewpoint, the designed mechanism should be free from the 
details of the model specifications. However, previous works designed mechanisms that 
were heavily dependent on the state space, the social choice function that maps states to 
alternatives, and the state-dependent utility functions. If we overlook the agents’ social 
preferences and focus only on their material interests, it will be impossible to implement 
the socially desirable alternatives  by merely designing detail-free mechanisms. 
This paper demonstrates that incorporating behavioral economics into the 
implementation theory is an effective method from the practical viewpoint. Let us consider   4
a mechanism à la Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994), which is described in the following 
message that the central planner conveys to the three agents, i.e., agents 1, 2, and 3. 
I request each agent to tell me a sufficiently large K  number of times about what 
I should do for the social benefit. I will randomly select one announcement 
profile from these K   profiles. If two or three agents make the same 
recommendation, I will follow it; otherwise I will do nothing. I also request agent 
1 to tell me once more about what I should do. By using the (1 ) K th +− 
announcement as reference, I wish to identify and penalize liars. I will impose a 
small fine of  0 ε >   if and only if you are agent 2 or agent 3 and are one of the 
last agents to deviate from this (1 ) K th + −  announcement. 
This mechanism is entirely free from the specifications of the state space, the social choice 
function, the utility functions, and even the set of alternatives. Further, this mechanism has 
severe multiplicity of the Nash equilibria as long as the agents are motivated merely by 
their material interests. With respect to alternatives, the constant announcement of an 
alternative by all the agents results in the Nash equilibrium in this case. 
This paper argues that this multiplicity is not robust to the agent’s slight behavioral 
motives. As long as the other agents follow this Nash equilibrium, agent 1’s 
announcements do not influence the alternative choice and the monetary transfer to her/him, 
that is, her/his material interests. Further, her/his announcements merely influence the other 
agents’ material interests, because only small fines are permitted. In this case, agent 1 
should be expected not to speak any white lie because of her/his guilt aversion named 
“white lie aversion.” This along with iterative removals is the driving force behind 
eliminating dishonest announcements. 
Each agent should display some inclination to engage in white lie aversion; such 
inclination is all that is needed for this mechanism to function. The possibility theorem is 
very permissive—given the presence of a slight white lie aversion, any alternative is 
uniquely implemented in iterative dominance as long as the agents regard this alternative 
as being socially desirable.   5
The present paper does not require any restriction on their preferences, with the 
exception of a naïve form of white lie aversion. In contrast, Matsushima (2007) 
investigated incomplete information by assuming quasi-linearity and expected utility. The 
mechanisms designed in Matsushima (2007) depended on the social choice function. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines 
iterative dominance, and Section 4 defines white lie aversion and depicts the main theorem.    6
2. The Model 
 
We consider a situation wherein the central planner is not aware of the socially 
desirable alternative, whereas agents 1, 2, and 3 are aware of it. The central planner 
delegates the alternative choice to these agents using the following procedure. The central 
planner requests each agent to announce the alternative K  number  of  times,  following 
which she/he randomly selects one announcement profile from among these K  profiles. 
Here,  0 > K  is a sufficiently large positive integer. If at least two agents announce the 
same alternative, then she/he chooses that alternative. In the absence of such an alternative, 
she/he chooses the status quo given by aA ∈ , where A denotes the set of alternatives. 
Further, the central planner requests agent 1 to announce the alternative once more as the 
(1 ) K th +−  announcement. The central planner imposes a fine  0 ε >   if and only if the 
agent is agent 2 or agent 3 and is one of the last agents to deviate from this (1 ) K th +− 
announcement. We permit only small fines, i.e., ε   is close to zero. The (1 ) K th +− 
announcement of agent 1 does not influence the alternative choice. Agent 1 is never fined. 
The above procedure is described by the following mechanism:  (, , ) GM x t = . Let  i M  
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announcement profile. 
A simple lottery over alternatives is defined as  : [0,1] A α → , which has a countable 
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Let ∆ denote the set of simple lotteries. Let  : xM →∆,  N i i t t ∈ = ) ( , and  :{ , 0 } i tM ε →−  
for all  {1, 2, 3} i∈ . When the agents announce a message profile mM ∈ , the central planner   7
chooses any alternative aA ∈  with  probability  () ()[ 0 , 1 ] xm a∈   and certainly makes a 
monetary transfer  (){ , 0 } i tm ε ∈−  to each agent i. 
For every  M m∈ , specify 
, #{ {1,..., }| }
() ()
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and 
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For every  {1,..., } kK ∈ , the central planner selects the  th k −  announcement  profile 
3
1, 2, 3, (,,) kkk mmm A ∈  with probability 
1
K
 and chooses any alternative  A a∈  when at least 
two agents announce this alternative, i.e., 
a m k i = ,  for at least two agents  {1,2,3} i∈ . 
In the absence of such an alternative, she/he chooses the status quo a . 
For every  M m∈ , specify 
    1() 0 tm= , 
for every  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i , 
() i tm ε = −  if  there  exists  {1,..., } kK ∈  such that  ,1 , 1 ik K mm + ≠  and 
2, 3, 1, 1 hhK mmm + = =  for all  { 1,..., } hk K ∈ + , 
and 
() 0 i tm=    if there exists no such k . 
Each agent  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i  is fined if and only if she/he is one of the last agents to deviate from 
the (1 ) K th +− announcement  1, 1 K mA + ∈  of agent 1. Agent 1 is never fined. 
This mechanism does not depend on the specifications of the state space, the social 
choice function, and the utility functions.   8
3. Iterative Dominance 
 
A preference for each agent  {1, 2, 3} i∈   is defined as an ordering 
i ∼    on 
{, 0 } M ε ∆× − × . Here, (,,) ( ,, ) ii
i
rm rm α α′ ′′
∼    implies that agent i does not prefer (, ,) i rm α′′ ′  
to  (,,) i rm α , and (,,) ( ,, ) ii i rm rm α α′′ ′    implies  that  agent  i  strictly  prefers  (,,) i rm α  to 
(, ,) i rm α′′ ′ , that is, (,,) ( ,, ) ii
i
rm rm α α′ ′′
∼    and  [ ( ,, ) (,, ) ] ii
i
rm rm α α ′ ′′
∼ ∼  . Further, 
(,,) ( ,, ) ii i rm rm α α′′ ′ ∼  implies that agent i is indifferent between (,,) i rm α  and (, ,) i rm α′′ ′ , 
that is, (,,) ( ,, ) ii
i
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∼    and (, ,)( , ,) ii
i
rm rm α α ′ ′′
∼   . 
  Since the negative transfer  ε −  harms an agent’s welfare, it is appropriate to assume 
that for every  {1, 2, 3} i∈  and (,) mM α ∈∆× , 
   ( , 0 , ) ( , , ) i mm α αε −   . 
Given that K  is sufficiently large, it is appropriate to assume that for every  {1, 2, 3} i∈ , 
(,) mM α ∈∆× , and α′∈∆, 
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where Γ and  ′ Γ  denote the supports of the simple lotteries α  and α′, respectively. Since 
K  is sufficiently large, assumption (1) implies that as long as the difference between the 
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The solution concept is iterative dominance; let  i i M M =
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Recursively, for every  1,2,... λ = , let 
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= ∩ . A message profile  M m∈   is said to be 
uniquely iteratively undominated in ( , ) G
∼    if 
() {} M m
∞ = .  
Arbitrarily fix any alternative  A a ∈
* , which is regarded as the socially desirable 
alternative. Let 
**
, () ii k i mm M =∈  denote the honest message for agent i, where 
* *
, a m k i =  for 
all  k . The honest message profile 
* ***
123 (,,) mm m mM =∈   induces the socially desirable 
alternative 
* a  with no monetary transfers, i.e.,  
   
** () ( ) 1 xm a =  and 
* ()0 i tm =  for all  } 3 , 2 , 1 { ∈ i .   10
4. White Lie Aversion 
 
We introduce a condition on 
∼   named white lie aversion that requires each agent to 
dislike telling a lie as long as this lie does not influence the alternative choice and the 
monetary transfer to her/him. 
 
White Lie Aversion: For every  1 (,,) { , 0 } rm M α ε ∈∆× − ×  and every  11 1 \{ } mMm ′∈ , 
(2)     1111 1 (,, ( , ) ) (,,) rm m r m α α − ′    if 
*
1, 1, {, } kk ma m ′ ∈  and 
**
1, 1, [] [] kk ma ma ′ =⇒ = 
for all  {1,..., 1} kK ∈ + . 
  
For every  {2,3} i∈ , every ( , , ) { ,0} i rm M α ε ∈∆× − × , and every  \{ } ii i mMm ′∈ , 
(3)     (,, ( , ) ) (,,) iii i
i
rm m r m α α − ′
∼    if 
*
,, {, } ik ik ma m ′ ∈  and 
**
,, [] [] ik ik ma ma ′ =⇒ = 
for all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈ . 
 
  Note that agent 1 strictly prefers not to speak white lies, while this is not necessarily 
the case with agents 2 and 3. 
 
The Theorem: Under white lie aversion, the honest message profile 
* mM ∈  is uniquely 
iteratively undominated in (,) G
∼   . 
 
Proof: Since  () x m  and  1() tm are independent of  1, 1 K m + , it follows from (2) that agent 1 has 
a strict incentive to announce 
*
,1 iK ma + = . Arbitrarily fix  {1,..., } kK ∈  and  M m∈  and 
suppose that 
*
,1 iK ma + =  
and 
*
, ih ma =  for all  {1, 2, 3} i∈  and all  {1 , . . . , } hk K ∈ + .   11
Let us consider agent  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i . Suppose 
*
, ik ma ≠ . Let  i i M m ∈ ′  be the message for 
agent i such that 
*
, ik ma ′ =  and  ,, ih ih mm ′ =  for all hk ≠ . 
If 
*
, jk ma =  for all  j i ≠ , 
then ( ) x m  is independent of  , ik m  and  (, ) ( )0 ii i i tmm tm − ′ − ≥  holds. This along with (1) and 
(3) implies that agent i has a strict incentive to announce  i m′ instead of  i m . If 
*
, jk ma ≠  for some  i j ≠ , 
then  (, ) ( ) ii i i tmm tm ε − ′ −=  holds. This along with (1) and (3) implies that agent i  has a 
strict incentive to announce  i m′ instead of  i m , because 
1
() ( ) ( , ) ( ) ii
a




′ − ≤ ∑
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holds, where Γ and  ′ Γ  denote the supports of  () x m  and  (, ) ii x mm − ′ , respectively. 
Let us consider agent 1. Suppose 
*
1,k ma ≠  and 
*
, ik ma =  for each  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i . 
Let  1 1 M m ∈ ′  be the message for agent 1 such that 
*
1,k ma ′ =  and  1, 1, hh mm ′ =  for all hk ≠ . 
Since  () x m  is independent of  1,k m  and  11 1 1 (, ) ( )0 tmm tm − ′ = =  holds, it follows from (2) that 
agent 1 has a strict incentive to announce  1 m′ instead of  1 m . Hence, we have proved that 
* m   is  uniquely  iteratively  undominated.       Q.E.D.   12
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